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Abstract
This paper studies how employers collect information about the quality of work-
ers. Two are the strategies: screening ex-ante, through the recruitment process, and
monitoring new hires at work, or screening on-the-job. Using two datasets represen-
tative of workers in Great Britain, we provide empirical evidence that the optimal
choice is related to the type of employment contract o¤ered by the rm. Our es-
timates show that temporary workers are associated with lower recruitment e¤ort
- in terms of lower cost and higher speed - and closer monitoring than permanent
employees. But this relation depends crucially on the type of jobs. Di¤erences in
screening e¤ort are substantial for low-level occupations, while the gap is marginal
or not signicant for high-skilled jobs.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, labor markets have experienced a deep restructuring, both
in the U.S. and in European countries. A common phenomenon has been the substantial
growth in the use of atypical labor contracts. This term refers to xed-term arrange-
ments (employees hired on the company payroll either for a specic period of time or
for a specic project), temporary-help agency employment (workers employed through
a temporary help agency), on-call work and day labor (individuals who are called in
on an as-needed basis), independent contractors (formally self-employed, but, de facto,
they work as subordinate of the unique client) and, more generally, any employment re-
lationship that can be regarded as contingent.1 In this paper, we will focus the analysis
only on those contracts characterized by the temporariness of the employment relation-
ship, and show that the employment regulation has relevant implications for the rms
screening strategy.
The literature has focused on the "workersside of the problem", analyzing, in par-
ticular, the impact of labor market reforms on the transition rates to permanent employ-
ment. On one hand, exible contracts may provide young unexperienced workers with a
"port-of-entry" into permanent employment. On the other hand, accepting a temporary
contract may attach a stigma to workers, reducing their chances to get better oppor-
tunities. Both hypothesis have been tested on several national datasets.2 In contrast,
little e¤ort has been devoted to understanding the e¤ect of temporary contracts on the
employersside.3
This paper contributes to the literature in this direction. We study the impact of
atypical contracts on the screening process, i.e. the set of activities implemented by the
employer to gather information about workersquality.
The importance of search for information in the labor market is widely recognized,
starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1962). The literature on employerssearch
behavior focuses on the recruitment process and results point out that the choice of the
recruitment method varies with rm characteristics, vacancy characteristics and skill
requirements of jobs. We argue that it also depends on the type of contract is going
to be signed. Furthermore, we analyze both the recruitment process, screening ex-ante,
and the monitoring process, screening on-the-job. Employers may acquire information
through both channels: they can choose to accurately screen applicants before hiring
them or rather detect bad workers on the job, through supervision. In the former
1Contingent work is generally dened as an employment relationship such that there is neither an
explicit nor an implicit contract for long-term employment or in which the minimum hours vary unsys-
tematically (Polivka and Nardone, 1989).
2Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2000) for UK; Canziani and Petrongolo (2001) for Spain; Contini,
Pacelli and Villosio (2000) for UK, Germany and Italy; Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2004) for Italy nd
that positive e¤ects are prevailing. While the adverse e¤ects are pointed out in Blanchard and Landier
(2001), and Guell and Petrongolo (2004).
3Notably, an exception is Wasmer (1999) . He examines the relative demand of temporary workers
whithin a matching model where rms can choose between hiring a sequence of xed-term employees
(high-turnover strategy), or a permanent set of indenite-term workers (low-turnover strategy).
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case, the initial cost of recruitment will avoid hiring - and eventually ring - unsuitable
workers. In the latter, the initial saving could be compensated by higher ring costs.
We use two datasets from the UK Data Archive: the "Survey of EmployersRecruit-
ment Practices" (ERP)4 and the "Skills Survey" (SS). Both of them are representative of
workers in Great Britain in the 90s. The former contains detailed information about re-
cruitment practices of over 5,000 establishments and their ve more recent engagements.
We construct two indicators of investment in screening ex-ante: speed and cost. They are
indicative of employersperception of the speed and cost of several available recruitment
channels, such as advertisement in newspapers, noticeboards, job centre, and recommen-
dations. The second survey includes some information about monitoring, as perceived
by 2,500 workers. A major concern is the distinction between monitoring-to-learn work-
ersquality and monitoring-to-control workerse¤ort. We assume that tenured workers
are supervised only in order to avoid shirking. This hypothesis is crucial to isolate the
learning component of monitoring.
The data allow to identify the relationship between screening e¤ort - recruitmen-
speed, recruitment-cost, monitoring-intensity - and the employment arrangement, con-
trolling for rms, jobsand workerscharacteristics. We provide empirical evidence that
atypical workers are associated with lower investment in recruitment, and closer mon-
itoring. This is especially true for low-level occupations, while the gap is marginal or
not signicant for high-skilled jobs. The robustness of our results is tested under various
specications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
previous literature on employers search strategies and presents the novelties of this
study. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Methodology and
results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the main ndings and concludes.
2 Previous literature
Starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1962), the importance of search for information
in the labor market has been recognized, and an extensive literature developed. Job
seekers and employers acquire information about each other through several channels,
and the more information they obtain, the higher the likelihood of a good employment
match. Most of the literature focuses on the workerssearch strategies. Instead, we are
interested in the employerssearch. Employers may collect information about workers
productivity in di¤erent moments: during the recruitment process, or monitoring the
performance on-the-job.5
4This dataset has been used by Pellizzari (2004) in order to derive implications about the employers
recruitment strategy with respect to job qualications. Here the focus is on the employment contract.
5The problem of gathering information about workersproductivity may also be confronted o¤ering
incentive-compatible contracts, such that only good workers will accept them. The design of the optimal
employment arrangement is the subject of contract theory, and, in particular, of agency theory. See for
istance Hart and Holmstrom (1987), for an introduction, and Hosios and Peters (1993).
3
The literature on recruitment has developed along two main streams: the measure
and classication of the search process, and the analysis of its outcomes, expressed as
vacancy duration or as the quality of the resulting employment matches. Barron and
Bishop (1985) distinguish between extensive and intensive search. The former pertains
to the number of applicants seen and interviewed, the latter is measured by the number
of hours devoted to screening and interviewing per applicant. They empirically measure
the two components of employers search and examines the e¤ects of employers and
job characteristics, and labor market conditions on search intensity. A di¤erent char-
acterization has been fostered by Rees: formal versus informal recruitment methods.
Rees (1966) analyzes the role of the recruitment method as an information-generating
device and concludes that informal methods, i.e. asking current employees or friends
for referrals, are more e¤ective than formal methods, such as advertising and the use
of employment agencies. Among the most recent studies, van Ours and Ridder (1992)
and Burdett and Cunningham (1998) estimate how rm and job characteristics a¤ect
vacancy duration, as a measure of the employers search intensity. The hazard rate of
lling a vacancy is higher for larger rms, that have easier access to potential workers,
while higher skill requirements and large training costs entail a longer selection process.
Devaro (2003, 2005) analyzes the choice of the recruitment methods - such as newspaper
advertisements, word-of-mouth, employment agencies, etc. - as determined by rm and
vacancy characteristics and skill requirements of jobs. Some channels generate appli-
cants more quickly than others, but, on average, of lower quality. The choice of the
recruitment method solves the tradeo¤ and a¤ects vacancy duration and starting wages.
Monitoring employeess performance is an additional information-generating device.
In the theoretical model developed by Jovanovic (1979), employers update their believes
about workersquality according to the output observed at the end of each period, and
decide whether to separate or not. The choice of the optimal level of monitoring has been
analyzed in the principal-agent theoretical framework. On one hand, prospects of close
supervision may deter low productive workers from applying for the job (see for instance
Hart and Holmstrom (1987)). On the other hand monitoring too much may turn out to
be suboptimal if it prevents bad workers from misbehaving and, therefore, revealing their
type, during the probationary period (Ichino and Muehlheusser (2003)). Furthermore,
other factors are involved in the choice of monitoring. Bac (2000) and Felli and Harris
(2004) study the tradeo¤between training and screening on-the-job. Screening e¢ ciency
may have to be sacriced given the employers postcontract incentives to invest in rm
specic training, or the productivity of the investment technology may have to be reduced
in order to induce an e¢ cient screening process.
The purpose of this paper is to jointly analyze the two screening strategies. We
believe that the choices of the optimal investment in recruitment and in monitoring are
interdependent. The employer chooses the optimal combination of screening ex-ante and
screening on-the-job comparing their costs and their benets, which depends also on the
regulation of the employment relationship, i.e. on the contract is going to be signed.
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Opening a vacancy, a rm has to decide how to carry out the recruitment in or-
der to ll the open position with a suitable worker and with the right timing. There
exist several channels of recruitment: jobcentres, fee-charging agencies, notices on the
press, internal notices, personal recommendation, direct applications, etc. They di¤er in
cost, e¤ectiveness and speed. For instance, applying to the jobcentre is cheap and even
e¤ective and fast if the rm is looking for an operative, unskilled workers, whereas it
would probably be ine¤ective when searching for an experienced manager. The choice
of the recruitment channel is strictly related to the occupation the rm wants to ll and
to the characteristics of the desired applicant. However, it also depends on the type
of employment contract. Searching and screening ex-ante applicants entails a cost, in
terms of money spent and time devoted. Those costs are sunk: the rm recoups them
during the lifetime of the employment relationship, through the surplus produced by the
worker, and the more accurate is the recruitment, the higher the probability of hiring
the best applicant and the larger is the expected surplus. The choice of the recruitment
method has to balance the ex-ante cost of screening with the ex-post expected benets.
The duration of the contract is likely to play a determinant role: the longer is the ex-
pected length of the employment relation, the smoother the amortization of the initial
investment, and the employer will be more willing to pay for recruitment. Furthermore,
when long-term arrangements impose ring tax, its even more important to closely sort
out permanent workers with respect to temporary ones, in order to avoid laid o¤ costs.6
A di¤erent strategy can be implemented in order to screen workers: employers may
choose to save on recruitment, and invest more in monitoring the new hires, valuate
their performance and, eventually, dismiss the unsuitable employees. The optimality of
this strategy depends on the regulation of the employment contract: when ring costs
are high, it is probably not convenient to substitute screening ex-ante with screening on-
the-job, because detecting bad workers after hiring them would entails the payment of
the dismissal cost or, if it is too expensive to re them and the employees are retained,
the monitoring costs would be a net loss. Instead, it could be e¢ cient to supervise
temporary workers, whose dismissal involves lower costs.7
Another branch of the literature is partly related to our work: the analysis of labor
adjustment costs. Hiring costs are generated by the recruitment process, they consist
of employer expenses on job advertising and search rm fees. Goux et al. (2001) esti-
mate the structure of costs of hiring and ring workers and relate it to the employment
arrangement. Using a French panel, they show that it is much less costly to adjust the
number of temporary employees than to adjust the number of permanent ones.8 Similar
results are obtained in Abowd and Kramarz (2003), and Kramarz and Michaud (2004).
6This is true also in liberal labor markets. Severance payments and dismissal taxes are not prohibitive
in U.K., but ring costs also include more subtle and psycological e¤ects: hiring and ring regular workers
frequently may prove to tarnish a rms reputation, making it more di¢ cult for the organization to recruit
permanent employees in the future (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993).
7Houseman (2001). provides some empirical evidence of the use of temporary contracts as a screen-
ing device. Firms may ll vacancies with xed-term workers, monitor them throughout the exible
arrangement and conrmed as permanent only those employees who turn out be highly productive.
8Goux et al (2001) do not use direct measures of hiring and separation costs. They estimate the
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They also use French data at establishment level. Hiring costs are regressed on the num-
ber of new hires under temporary contracts and permanent ones. The low estimated cost
of hiring on short-term arrangements is regarded as an underlying cause of the tendency
to recruit mostly on temporary contracts.
Our analysis of the screening ex-ante e¤ort may look similar to these studies, but
there are two important di¤erences: the perspective from which we examine the hiring
cost, and the data we use. The adjustment cost literature tries to explain the dynamic
of labor demand as determined by the shape and magnitude of hiring and separation
costs. On the contrary, we think that recruitment costs are not exogenously given, but
recruitment methods, and the relative costs, are purposefully chosen by employers. Hir-
ing temporary workers is cheaper because employers decided to spend less in recruiting
them. The second di¤erence pertains the data employed in the analysis: the ERP survey
provides detailed information about jobsand new hirescharacteristics at engagement
levels, whereas the dataset used in Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and in Kramarz and
Michaud (2004) are at establishment level and contains information only about total
expenditures, workersows, and the occupational distribution of new hires and sepa-
rations. Therefore, we are better equipped to distinguish the role of the contract type
on hiring costs from composition e¤ects arising from the distribution of jobs and skills
requirements among contracts. Furthermore, the availability of several engagements for
each rms allows us to control for rm unobservables.
3 Data
We use two distinct datasets on UK: the Survey of EmployersRecruitment Practices,
1992 and the Skills Survey, 1997. The former provides information about the recruitment
process, the latter includes some questions on monitoring on-the-job.
3.1 Survey of EmployersRecruitment Practices
Data used in the empirical analysis of the screening ex-ante process come from a detailed
employer-engagement dataset: the Survey of EmployersRecruitment Practices (ERP)
conducted in the United Kingdom in 1992.9 This study was carried out by the British
Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), on behalf of the Employment Service,
in order to provide an understanding of employersuse and perceptions of the various
recruitment channels available to them. A selected sample of over 10,000 establishment,
drawn by the Census of Employment for 1989,10 were rst contacted in Autumn 1991
shape of those costs exploiting data on workersow at establishment level. Identication relies on the
structure of the model of labor demand.
9Hales, J., EmployersRecruitment Practices : The 1992 Survey [computer le]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Archive [distributor], March 1999. SN: 3694.
10The 1989 Census covered all existing establishments with 25 or more employees and was supple-
mented by a random sample of smaller establishment. The sample is not random but designed to ensure
6
via a brief preliminary telephone interview in order to categorize them into recruiting
- establishment that either had recruited one or more employees in the previous 12
months or had unlled vacancies at the time of the interview - versus non-recruiting
establishment. The longer face-to-face interview took place between May and November
1992. Within each establishment, the respondents were selected to be the main person
responsible for the recruitment process.
Questions regarding the establishments were grouped into three sections: a general
inquiry about the type of rm and the role of the respondent; the characteristics of the
workforce and information about current vacancies and recent recruits; detailed questions
about the recruitment practices usually adopted by the rm.
A further set of questions was asked to the 5,635 recruiting establishment. Five
of the more recent engagements11 were selected in order to cover the largest variety
of occupational groups, as dened by the Standard Occupational Classication (SOC).
This led to a sample of 20,054 engagements, for each of whom detailed information -
about the characteristics of the job, those of the newly hired worker, the recruitment
methods activated, whether the recruit was still employed ad how satised the employer
was with her - were collected. Those data allow to identify the factors a¤ecting the
screening ex-ante procedures and their relation with the type of contract. Descriptive
statistics of the full sample and of the subsample used in the regressions are shown in
Table 1. It is worth noting that atypical contracts (temporary, causal, xed term and
self-employed) account for about 20 per cent of the total number of engagements (one
third in weighted values).
We constructed two indexes of the recruitment e¤ort using answers to questions E39
and E40 of the questionnaire:
E39: Using the scale on this card [from 1 (=not at all important)
to 7 (=very important)], how important a factor in your use of the
recruitment method(s) was the speed with which you expected it/they
would provide a suitable recruit on this occasion?
E40: Looking at the scale again, how important a factor in your use
of recruitment method(s) was keeping down the cost of announcing/
advertising the vacancy on this occasion?
They refer to the second most recent engagement and have been asked to all of the
recruiting establishments.
Each answer has been associated with the channel that led to the rst contact with
that the number of establishments selected in each size category and region was su¢ cient to allow
meaningful analysis. For this reason, small rms and rms outside London and the South East were
oversampled. However, weights are provided to recover population proportions.
11An engagement was dened as "Recruiting an employee, where a new contract of employment is
involved". This includes internal transfers and promotions.
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or by the person recruited12 and indexes of speed (=E39) and cost (= E40) of each
recruitment method are computed as the average, over rm, of the respective valuations.
This means that the cost-index of "jobcentre" is equal to the mean of the valuations
assigned to E40 by all of the establishments that rst met the new employee, in the second
engagement, through the jobcentre. In Section 2 we stressed that the same channel may
have di¤erent cost, e¤ectiveness and speed when applied to di¤erent jobs. In order to
account for this heterogeneity the averages have been computed within engagements for
similar jobs. Indexes have been computed according to two di¤erent grouping schemes:
 Scheme A: skilled (professional associate & technical occupations; professionals;
management and administration); unskilled (routine unskilled, operatives and as-
sembly, sales, protective and personal services, craft and skilled services, clerical
and secretarial occupations)
 Scheme B: skilled (professional associate & technical; professional; management
and administration); low skilled (sales, protective and personal service, craft and
skilled service, clerical and secretarial); unskilled (routine unskilled, operatives and
assembly).
Results for method B are shown in Figures 1 and 2. It is clear that the valuation
of each recruitment channel is not general but relative to the job position it has to ll.
For instance, consulting the job centre is among the cheapest and fastest channel to ll
a routine or operative occupation (SOC 1-2), but it is not regarded as cheap nor fast
when looking for professional workers and managers.
The recruitment process of each engagement is valuated according to the judgement
on the channel that led to the rst contact with the employee. In the end, we have two
indexes of recruitment e¤ort for each engagement: cost and speed.
3.2 Skills Survey
The former dataset does not provide any information about monitoring practices of
employers. Therefore we used a di¤erent source of data: the Skills Survey (SS). This
survey was conducted in 1997 by the National Centre for Social Research, on behalf
of the Economic and Social Research Council. The survey was the centerpiece of a
12The survey also provides information about the other recruitment channels involved in the selection
process, and the order in which they were implemented. The set of channels used rst corresponds to the
initial choice of the employer. It is questionable whether answers to E39 and E40 refers to the rst method
or to the successful one. In the former case, we should limit our attention to the recruitment channels
used rst. But this piece of information is missing for more than two thirds of the engagements, whereas
95 per cent provide the answer on the rst contact with the employee. Furthermore, in 63 per cent cases
the channel that led to the rst contact was implemented as a rst choice, and in 29 per cent cases as
a second choice. Associating the recruitmen e¤ort valuations to the rst-contact channel, instead of the
rst-implemented method, allow us to benet from a larger sample. Estimates have been performed
also using the rst-implemented channels and results are qualitatively similar, but fewer coe¢ cients are
statistically signicant. Detailed results are available at http://sarapinoli.at.googlepages.com.
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project entitled "Learning, Skills and Economic Rewards", directed by Francis Green,
with David Ashton and Alan Felstead. The major purpose was to measure and examine
di¤erent types of skills of the workforce. The sample was based on the Postcode Address
File (PAD) and involved random probability methods. Stratication was used to ensure
the sample points were spread throughout Great Britain.13 Only individuals in work and
aged 20-60 years old were eligible to the face-to-face interview, that took place between
January and May 1997. In the end, the sample includes 2467 records, with a response
rate of 67 per cent.
The dataset contains information on people in work and their jobs. The questionnaire
is composed of several sections: broad questions about the current job and the employing
organization, including the employment contract type, attitudes and management skills,
competence, transferability of skills, pay and qualications, job held ve years ago,
personal details. Among the job analysis questions, it was asked:
B33: How closely are you supervised in your job?
1 Very closely
2 Quite closely
3 Not very closely
4 Not at all closely
5 Dont know
This piece of information is used in order to construct an index of monitoring in-
tensity (= B33). Note that, unlike the ERP survey, the SS questions were addressed
to the worker, not to the employer. Therefore, we have a measure of "workers percep-
tion" of being monitored, instead of the employers investment in screening on-the-job.
Furthermore, the dataset does not allow to control for rms nor workers specic e¤ects.
Our results are necessarily tentative because of data limitations.
4 Empirical Analysis
In Section 2 we conjectured that the optimal screening strategy depends on the type
of employment contract o¤ered. In particular we believe that employers favor recruit-
ment to screen permanent workers, while monitoring on-the-job may be more intense on
temporary recruits.
In this Section we tests these intuitions by empirically studying the link between the
type of contract and the screening e¤ort.
13With weights, the dataset is representative of adults in Great Britain and each individual in the le
had an equal chance of selection.
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4.1 Screening ex-ante
We constructed two indicators of recruitment e¤ort: cost and speed. Note that cost
and speed are two types of investment: investment in money, and investment in time.
Higher values are associated to larger cost and greater speed of the screening process.
If employers save on the recruitment of temporary workers, then we would observe
lower cost indexes and higher speed. The statistics in the last panel of Table 1 support
this intuition: the average cost index for temporary workers is -4.73, versus -4.50 for
permanent ones, and the speed index is, respectively, 5.58 and 5.46.
4.1.1 Econometric specication
The relation between recruitment e¤ort and the type of contract is estimated in a linear
framework for both indicators:
yijf = recruitment_effort = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf + "ijf (1)
Cijf = contract_type =

0 typical
1 atypical
where Wijf is the matrix of the characteristics of the worker in engagement i, job
j, rm f ; Fif are the rms specicities - that do not vary across jobs in the same
establishment - and jobs variables are collected in Jjf , namely:14
 worker characteristics: gender, age, ethnic group, disability, previous employment
status;
 rm characteristics: industry classication code, region, labor force, level of activ-
ity, trend of activity, quality of the workforce;
 job characteristics: occupation classication code, initial pay, supervision task,
standard recruitment procedure.
We assumed that the choice of the contract precedes the decision over the recruitment
procedure, that is C is predetermined. But, even if C comes rst, it is likely to be
determined by the same variables that do enter the recruitment-e¤ort equation. An
endogeneity bias may arise from the existence of unobservable characteristics of rms and
jobs. Those unobservable components are grouped in the error term "ijf = eijf +j+f
and, if correlated with C, cause inconsistency.
Thanks to the availability of several engagements per rm, we can correct for the
endogeneity bias by estimating a xed e¤ect (FE) model that nets out both unobserv-
ables:
14Most of those information have been collected for all the sample, but missing values are not unusual.
At the end, the subsample we used in regressions is smaller: 12,805 observations with respect to the
initial 20,054. Nevertheless, we can still assume that results are representative of the population, given
that the composition of the subsample is very closed to the initial one (Table 1).
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  rst step: cancel the rm xed-e¤ect by subtracting the average over j:
E (yijf ) = yif = + 0 Wif + 1Fif + 2 Jf +  Cif + 3Rf + eif +  + f(2)
yFEijf = yijf   yif = 0WFEijf + 2JFEjf + CFEijf + eFEijf + FEj (3)
  second step: cancel the job xed-e¤ect by including dummy variables for jobs DJ :
yFEijf = 0W
FE
ijf + 2J
FE
jf + C
FE
ijf + 
0DJ + eFEijf (4)
Interacted terms are added to the econometric specications to allow for di¤erenti-
ated e¤ects of contracts depending on occupational level and industry.
yFEijf = 0W
FE
ijf + 2J
FE
jf + C
FE
ijf DJ + 0DJ + eFEijf (5)
yFEijf = 0W
FE
ijf + 2J
FE
jf + C
FE
ijf DJ DI + 0DJ + eFEijf (6)
where DJ is a set of job dummy variables for routine unskilled occupations, operatives
and assembly workers, sales, personal and protective services, craft and related occu-
pations, clerical and secretarial jobs, associate professional and technical occupations,
professionals, managers and administrators. Industry dummies DI distinguish among
energy and water supply, manufacturing, construction and services. In order to limit the
number of regressors, DJ in equation 6 is a set of only 2 dummies: unskilled jobs (routine
unskilled occupations, operatives and assembly workers, sales, personal and protective
services, craft and related occupations, clerical and secretarial jobs) and skilled jobs
(associate professional and technical occupations, professionals, managers and adminis-
trators). In the end, three specications are estimated: equations 4, 5 and 6
Limitations:
All results presented in this study are derived by using data on recruiting establish-
ments. A potential issue is the selection bias. If rms selfselect themselves into one of
the two groups, recruiting and non-recruiting, according to a selection rule s such that:
E ("ijf jWijf ; Fif ; Jjf ; Cijf ; sf ) 6= 0 (7)
then the estimated coe¢ cients would be inconsistent. The selection rule can be
written as follows:
sf =

1 if sf > 0 recruiting establishment
0 if sf < 0 non-recruiting establishment
(8)
sf = Sf + jf (9)
yijf = y

ijf  I
 
sf > 0

=

yijf if sf = 1
  if sf = 0 (10)
where sf represents the FOC from maximizing prots on workforce, Sf comprises eco-
nomic variables likely to a¤ect hiring decision of rm f and can include the same regres-
sors as the main equation, 1, and yijf is a latent index of recruitment e¤ort.
11
Estimating equation 1 would give us:
E (yijf jWijf ; Fif ; Jjf ; Cijf ; sf = 1) = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf + E ("ijf jjf )
= + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf +  (Sf) (11)
There is no selection bias only if "ijf is not correlated with jf . While the bias arises
when both the selection equation and the main equation include correlated unobservable
variables as regressors. This is likely to be true: the choices of whether to hire new
workers or not, sf , and how to recruit them, yijf , depend probably on roughly the same
set of variables, observable and unobservable.
Nevertheless, controlling for rm and job xed e¤ects, the selection rule component,
 (Sf), is canceled out and consistency is ensured.15
4.1.2 Results
Results from estimates of equations 4, 5 and 6 are shown in Tables 4 and 5, columns
(1), (2) and (3) respectively. They refer to cost and speed indexes computed according
to scheme B (see Subsection 3.1). Di¤erent specications and more detailed results are
available upon request.
Table 3 reports the estimated e¤ect of the contract type on recruitment cost, con-
trolling for jobs and workers characteristics and rm specic e¤ects. As expected,
temporary contracts are associated with signicantly lower recruitment cost.
Occupation interacted terms, column (2), are negative and most of them are sta-
tistically signicant. Exceptions are protective and personal services, craft and skilled
services, professionals and managers. Personal characteristics of the employees are likely
to play a more relevant role in skilled job outcomes, than in routine-unskilled occupa-
tions. Therefore skilled jobs may require a thorough selection regardless of the contract
type, in order to avoid an inconvenient match. This may explain the lack of signicance
of some interacted terms. Nonetheless, results may be traced back to the small number
of engagements observed in the above-mentioned occupations.
Regression in column (3) allows the e¤ect of the type of contract to di¤er accord-
ing to occupations and industries: skills required to an operative workers employed in
constructions are probably very di¤erent from those required to an operative workers in
service sector, and the role of the contract type may also be diversied. As a matter
of fact, coe¢ cients in column (3) are signicantly di¤erent: temporary workers are less
screened in construction, whereas the contract e¤ect is marginal for those employed in
services. Note that coe¢ cients are signicantly negative when associated to unskilled
occupations, but they are not statistically di¤erent from zero for engagements in skilled
jobs, except for the construction sector.
The estimated coe¢ cients of control variables, not reported here, have the expected
sign. There is a clear pattern in the cost of recruitment methods used by occupation
15Note that results are representative only of recruiting rms.
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and skill requirements: higher qualications require larger investment in screening ex-
ante, whereas a small cost is a¤orded to recruit unskilled workers. Less attention is paid
to keeping down the cost of recruiting young workers, probably because they are more
di¢ cult to value - they lack employment history. Furthermore, more expensive methods
are implemented when a rm is looking for an employed applicant. On the other side,
rms using standard recruitment procedures tend to spend less.
Turning to the analysis of the recruitment speed index, in Table 4 we report the
estimated impact of temporary arrangements. Engagements involving atypical work-
ers are associated with faster recruitment methods: time spent in searching is also an
investment that rms want to minimize when the contract is temporary.
The type of job and the industry do matters. The speed of the screening process
of temporary workers is less di¤erentiated from the screening process of permanent
workers when looking for a skilled worker: the magnitude and signicance of the relative
coe¢ cients are smaller, especially in the service sector. The coe¢ cients of the interacted
terms with protective and personal services and managers are not statistically di¤erent
from zero, in line with results from cost regressions. Surprisingly, skilled temporary
workers in manufacturing are associated with lower speed of the recruitment method
with respect to permanent ones: the estimated coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at
10 per cent condence level.
Control variablescoe¢ cients are coherent with recruitment cost regression. Young
individuals and employed applicants are associated with channels that are not only more
expensive, but also slower: higher investment of time and money is devoted to screen
them. Also, qualied jobs require longer and costly recruitment process.
4.1.3 Robustness tests
The relationship between the contract type and recruitment has been estimated using
several specications.
The valuation of cost and speed of a recruitment channel depends on the type of
vacancy has to be lled. Therefore indexes have been computed within occupational
groups. As anticipated in Section 3.1, we followed two di¤erent schemes. Tables 4 and 5
show estimates for scheme B. Results using scheme A are qualitatively and quantitatively
very similar.
Among the recruitment methods, we decided to exclude waiting list. This channel
is valued as cheap and fast, but actually the employer had to invest time and money in
advance in order to build the waiting list. Therefore, valuations reported for this channel
are not reliable and all the engagements that involved waiting list as the rst-contact
channel are dropped. Furthermore, we left out promotions and internal transfers, i.e.
those employment arrangements between an employer and a worker who was already
employed at the establishment, but under a di¤erent contract. We are interested in
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the process through which the employer gather information about the workers quality.
Promoting, or transferring, a former employee is an outcome of the learning process,
whereas screening new workers is part of the process.
Equations 4, 5 and 6 have been estimated on this smaller sample and results are re-
ported in Tables 4 and 5, column (4), (5) and (6). Estimates for the cost index strengthen
previous ndings: coe¢ cients of contract and interacted terms are negative and most
of them are statistically signicant. Only high level qualications are associated to non
signicant values. Furthermore, the magnitude of the contract e¤ect is bigger. Speed
regressions on the subsample also conrm previous results: temporary arrangements are
associated to faster recruitment method. Coe¢ cients are very similar in magnitude and
in signicance level.
In Subsection 4.1.1 we showed that, if the contract type is decided before the re-
cruitment process, implementing a xed-e¤ect approach correct for endogeneity bias. In
the real world, the contract type is not always predetermined. The characteristics of the
rm and of the vacancy uniquely identify the skill requirements and the optimal choice
of employment contract and, ideally, we would like to estimate the following equation:
yijf = + 0W

ijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + C

ijf + "ijf (12)
whereW  and C are the ideal workers characteristics and contract type. It may happen
that, after screening some applicants without success, the employer decides to o¤er an
arrangement di¤erent from the ex-ante optimal choice, so that the observed W and C
do not correspond to W  nor C.16 Therefore the estimated regression would be:
yijf = + 0 (Wijf + !ijf ) + 1Fif + 2Jjf + 
 
Cijf +  ijf

+ "ijf (13)
= + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf + eijf
where Wijf + !ijf = W ijf and Cijf +  ijf = C

ijf . The error term is given by eijf =
"ijf + 0!ijf +  ijf , where !ijf and  ijf are two measurement errors. If measurement
errors are not correlated with W nor C, then no bias arises. Otherwise, OLS estimates
are inconsistent.
Imagine that an employer has a vacancy to ll and is looking for a worker with
characteristic W  to whom o¤er a permanent contract C = 0. The employer chooses
the screening e¤ort y in order to attract suitable applicants. If, unexpectedly, workers
with di¤erent quality W 6= W  apply for the job, the employer may decide to o¤er
a di¤erent contract. In particular, if W < W  (! < 0) it may be optimal to o¤er a
temporary contract, C = 1 > C ( > 0). The observed C and W are not correlated
with their respective measurement errors, but
Cov (C;!) = Cov ( ; !) < 0 (14)
Cov (W; ) = Cov (!;  ) < 0 (15)
16The employer may also choose to change recruitment method and to wait better quality applicants.
Then, the observed W and C would correspond to the ideal ones, and no bias would arise.
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so that C and W are correlated with the error term e and estimates would be biased.17
Nonetheless, this kind of endogeneity would strengthen our results. We argued that,
given W , the screening e¤ort y is negatively correlated with C, i.e. lower e¤ort is
exerted to recruit temporary workers. In the example, the employer is looking for a
permanent worker, therefore y is relatively high, but in the end a temporary contract is
signed, so that Cov (C; y) > 0. The bias goes against our hypothesis, i.e. Cov (C; y) < 0.
Therefore our estimates of the contract coe¢ cients are a lower bound, in absolute terms,
of the true values.
Endogeneity has been directly addressed by limiting the sample to non urgent en-
gagements. We dene as non urgent those engagements for which the employer answered
"no" to the following question:
D36: Suppose that for some reason he/she could not have started
work till a month later. Would this delay have mattered to you or
not?
If it is not urgent to ll the vacancy, then one should expect that only suitable
applicants are hired, whereas when applicants do not meet the ideal requirement, W 6=
W , the employer decide to wait instead than o¤ering a di¤erent employment contract.
Unfortunately question D36 has been asked for only two engagements over ve, and only
part of them are non urgent. In the end, the resulting subsample is fairly small: 1,489
observations versus 12,805 observations used in the main regressions. OLS estimates have
been performed on the subsample and results are reported in Tables 6 and 7, columns
(1), (2) and (3).18 The e¤ect of temporary contracts on screening cost (Table 5) is
negative, except for interacted terms with high level qualications in manufacturing and
construction. Some of the coe¢ cients are statistically signicant and their magnitude
is, in absolute terms, higher than estimates in Table 3 on the full sample. This support
the idea that endogeneity leads to attenuation bias. With regard to speed regressions
(Table 6), the contract e¤ect is positive and signicant, apart from interacted terms with
skilled occupations. Again, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is higher than estimates on
the full sample.19
17 In the example, ifW > W  we would have ! > 0 and  = 0: the contract signed is not di¤erent from
the ideal one. In this case, regressors are not correlated to the error term and estimates are consistent.
Same results are obtained if we consider a vacancy to be lled with a temporary contract, C = 1, and
W 6=W .
18We also ran FE regressions on the subsample of non urgent engagements. Results are shown in
Appendix A, Tables A.1.2 and A.2.2, available upon request. Only a few coe¢ cients are statistically
signicant and many interacted terms are dropped due to data limitations. Nonetheless, most of the
contract coe¢ cients have the expected sign (negative in cost regression, positive in speed regression),
and some of them are statistically signicant.
19 It has been objected that endogeneity may arise from simultaneity. A clear prediction of the search
literature (see Devaro (2003, 2005)) is that recruitment choice a¤ect the quality of the applicant pool:
the more you invest in screening, the higher will be the quality of applicants. Firms will be willing to
o¤er better arrangements to better applicants and the correlation that we nd among recruitment e¤ort
and contract type may reect reverse causality. We claim that this is not the case. Lets consider two
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Limiting the sample to non urgent engagements, also allows to deal with potential
spurious correlation resulting from the characteristics of temporary vacancies. Often,
rms hire workers under xed-term contract when facing temporary needs,20 due for in-
stance to regular workersabsences, or to uctuations in the demand. When these events
are unforeseen, employers may need to implement a fast recruitment methods in order
to ll the unexpected vacant position. In this case, the high speed index associated to
temporary arrangements would capture a characteristic of the vacancy, i.e. the urgency,
instead than the e¤ect of the contract type. This problem is overcome in the subsample
of non urgent engagements.21
In the end, we replicate the estimates on a subsample including only the second most
recent engagements, lets call them E. As explained in Section 3.1, rms were asked to
value the speed and cost of the method used to recruit E. Therefore, answers to E39 and
E40 are more appropriate as speed and cost indexes for engagements E. On the other
side, we cannot control for rm unobservables and the sample is fairly small. Tables 6
and 7 reports results for OLS estimates. Contract coe¢ cients have the expected sign,
but only a few of them are signicant.
Overall, results are robust to several specications: temporary contracts are associ-
ated with lower cost index and higher speed index. The di¤erence in the recruitment
e¤ort among contract type is marginal for high qualications.
4.2 Screening on-the-job
In this Section we use SS data to estimate the relationship between monitoring e¤ort
and employment contract. We expect the monitoring index to be lower for permanent
workers than for temporary ones, ceteris paribus. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 do
not give a clear prediction: a higher share of temporary workers perceive to be closely
supervised, but they are also more likely to be "not at all closely supervised".
vacancies, A and B for the same type of job, J , and requiring the same skills, W . The associated
screening e¤orts are yA and yB > yA, and the quality of applicants will be, respectively, WA and
WB > WA, so that the employer will o¤er a temporary contract for position A, and a permanent contract
for position B. But why should the recruitment e¤ort be di¤erentiated among the two vacancies? The
employer chooses the recruitment strategies that maximizes the expected prots, and she takes into
account all the variables that are a¤ected by the screening process. Our estimates for the recruitment
cost and speed are ceteris paribus, i.e. given the type of job and the characteristics of the worker and
of the rm. If the residual recruitment e¤ort is still di¤erent, this has to be explained by some other
characteristic of the vacancy: the type of contract o¤ered, C. It is not reasonable to assume that the
employer knows that the investment in screening y a¤ects the quality of the applicant pool W , but does
not anticipate that her choice of the employment contract depends on that quality W and, in turn, on
y. Therefore, we argue that the causality may go only from C to y, not viceversa.
20Other reason to hire under xed term contracts are screening and cost saving. See Abraham (1988)
and Abraham and Taylor (1996) for a discussion.
21We thank Luca Nunziata for pointing out this issue.
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4.2.1 Econometric specication
We used the same specication employed to analyze screening ex-ante:
yijf = monitoring_perception = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf + "ijf (16)
Cijf = contract_type =

0 typical
1 atypical
Control variables include:
 worker characteristics: gender, age, ethnic group, disability;
 rm characteristics: industry classication code, public or private sector, labor
force, whether the rm is committed to or recognized as an Investor in People (i.e.
government scheme to promote learning in organizations);
 job characteristics: occupation classication code, working day, supervision task,
whether involved in training, tenure.22
We also consider interacted terms of contract with occupational level and industry:
yijf = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf DJ + 0DJ + eijf (17)
yijf = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf DJ DI + 0DJ + eijf (18)
where DJ is a set of job dummy variables for routine unskilled occupations, operatives
and assembly workers, sales, personal and protective services, craft and related occu-
pations, clerical and secretarial jobs, associate professional and technical occupations,
professionals, managers and administrators. Industry dummies DI distinguish among
primary sector, energy and water supply, manufacturing, construction and services. In
order to limit the number of regressors, DJ in equation 18 is a set of only 2 dummies:
unskilled jobs (routine unskilled occupations, operatives and assembly workers, sales,
personal and protective services, craft and related occupations, clerical and secretarial
jobs) and skilled jobs (associate professional and technical occupations, professionals,
managers and administrators).
4.2.2 Results
Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 7, columns (1), (2) and (3), shows results for equations 16, 17 and 18 on the
full sample. Surprisingly, most of the coe¢ cients associated to temporary contract and
interacted terms are negative: temporary workers are less monitored than permanent
22Most of the respondents answered to all the questions, so that the sample comprises 2,020 observa-
tions, over 2,195 interviews.
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ones. But estimates are not statistically di¤erent from zero. If we restrict the sample
to workers with tenure lower than 5 years,23 coe¢ cients turn out to be mainly positive,
but still not signicant.
Results point out that employers monitor employees with di¤erent intensity depend-
ing on their tenure. Why? One reason may be that the object of monitoring is not
only to learn the quality of workers, but also to avoid shirking behavior. We are in-
terested only in the learning-side of monitoring, and we need to isolate it. The crucial
assumption is that all workers are monitored to induce higher e¤ort, but only newly
hired workers are screened on-the-job, whereas the employer already learnt the quality
of tenured employees. The di¤erence between the monitoring intensity on tenured and on
new workers gives the screening on-the-job component. Then, we want to test whether
this component is higher for temporary workers. The following equations capture this
idea:
yijf = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf  S + 0DJ + S + eijf (19)
yijf = + 0Wijf + 1Fif + 2Jjf + Cijf  S DJ + 0DJ + S + eijf (20)
where S is a dummy equal to one when the worker is short tenured. The e¤ect of
the contract type on screening on-the-job is accounted by .
Results are reported in Table 8. Column (1) corresponds to equation 19. The
estimate for  is positive, but not signicant. Note that the coe¢ cient associated to
temporary workers is negative, albeit not signicant. It may be that temporary workers
are overall less monitored, or that they are less concerned about being supervised.24 Both
hypothesis are sensible. On one side, contract theory predicts that short term contracts
enhance workerse¤ort because of the chance to be renewed, therefore less monitoring is
needed. On the other side, Cappelli and Sherer (1990) empirically nd, in a case study,
that temporary workers feel signicantly more satised with their supervision and more
committed than regular workers.
In column (2), equation 20, we allow temporary short-tenured workers to be associ-
ated with di¤erent screening on-the-job intensity depending on their occupation. Now
the e¤ect of the contract type is positive and highly signicant for short-tenured workers
in low skilled occupation. The coe¢ cients associated to the temporary workers, inter-
acted with occupation, are statistically negative for low qualication, whereas there is
no signicant di¤erence between temporary and permanent skilled workers.
23The Skills Survey include some retrospective questions. In particular it is asked:
F1: Were you in a paid work five years ago, that is in month and year?
and:
F2: Was this the same job as you have now? [INTERVIEWER: Only code yes
if the same job with the same employer.]
Short tenured workers are those who answered "No" either to question F1 or to question F2.
24We stressed in Section 3.2 that the monitoring index captures the workersperception about moni-
toring, not the employersinvestment. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between actual monitoring and
subjective perception of being supervised.
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We may interpret these results as evidence of higher screening-on-the job on short-
tenured temporary workers employed in low skilled jobs. If this is the case, the lower
recruitment investment found in Section 4.1 would be compensated by a more accurate
monitoring. But these results are only tentative and data limitations do not allow us to
further investigate this issue and to test the robustness.
5 Conclusion
Gathering information is an important process in the labor market. Both parties, the
worker and the rm, need to learn the characteristics of each other in order to im-
prove the employment match. Nonetheless, the employer screening behavior is a rela-
tively neglected area of empirical work in labor economics, due to the lack of detailed
data. Furthermore, the literature focused only on screening ex-ante, i.e. the recruitment
process.
We stress that employers collect information about the quality of workers at various
times: during the selection of applicants, screening ex-ante, and monitoring employees at
work, screening on-the-job. It is important to analyze both components of the screening
process, because they are substitutes and may be combined in di¤erent proportions.
The employers choice of the screening strategy depends on the characteristics of the
vacancy to be lled and, in particular, it depends on the type of employment contract
o¤ered. Permanent workers are costly to dismiss, therefore it is important to learn their
quality before ring tax becomes binding. On the contrary, temporary arrangements do
not entail ring costs, and the investment in recruitment can be lowered. But a short
recruitment process does not necessarily mean cursory screening, when it is compensated
by close monitoring.
This paper provides empirical evidence of the lower recruitment e¤ort exerted by em-
ployers when hiring temporary workers. Also some weak evidence of greater monitoring
in provided. We exploit two cross-sectional datasets: the ERP, a large establishment-
level survey about the recruitment behavior of employers, and the SS, which provides
some information about the monitoring process. Results show that rms spend less
and devote shorter time in hiring temporary workers, with respect to permanent ones.
This is especially true for low-level occupations, while the gap is marginal or not sig-
nicant for high-skilled jobs. A potential explanation is that personal characteristics
of the employees a¤ect more the outcome of skilled jobs than the output from routine-
unskilled occupations. Then, hiring a bad quality worker in a skilled job would be more
harmful than hiring a bad unskilled employee and a thorough selection would be needed
regardless of the contract type.
Turning to monitoring intensity, a major concern is the distinction between monitoring-
to-learn workersquality and monitoring-to-control workerse¤ort. We attempt to iden-
tify the learning component by assuming that tenured workers are supervised only in
order to avoid shirking, so that the di¤erence in monitoring between short-tenured em-
ployees and tenured ones results from screening on-the-job. Estimates show that tem-
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porary workers perceive to be more closely screened on-the-job than permanent ones.
Again, the di¤erence is signicant for low-level occupations, not for high-skilled jobs.
The growth in the use of temporary workers has been an important phenomenon in
Europe and U.S. during the last two decades. Understanding the e¤ects of employment
contracts is important to assess the reforms that led to this phenomenon. This study
focus only on the e¤ect on the employerschoice of the screening strategy. Screening
e¤ort a¤ects the quality of the workforce, but other factors are involved: the investment
in training and the adjustment to economic shocks. The role of the employment con-
tract is unclear. On one side, there is empirical evidence of lower investment in training
temporary workers.25 On the other side, the introduction of temporary arrangements
increased the response of rms to economic shocks, reducing mismatch and enhancing
overall productivity.26 Abowd et al. (2002) provide some evidence that productivity
depends more on the unmeasured personal characteristics of the employees, than on
the human capital accumulation. Therefore, it is more important to learn the quality
of the match through recruitment and monitoring on-the-job, than to invest on train-
ing. Nevertheless, a complete understanding of the impact of temporary contracts on
productivity requires a wider framework of analysis.
25See Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and Rix et al. (1999)
26Demand shocks and technology shocks change the productivity of existing jobs and may reverse the
protability of employment matches. The positive e¤ect of temporary contracts in reducing missmatch
is modeled in Alonso-Borrego et al (2004), Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Veracierto (2003).
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Figure 1. Recruitment channel valuation by job qualifications: cost index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Computation based on ERP, Employers’ Recruitment Practices Survey, 1992. 
Higher absolute values of the cost index are associated to lower cost of the channel. 
soc1= routine unskilled occupation 
soc2= operatives and assembly 
soc3= sales occupation 
soc4= personal and protective service occupations 
soc5= craft and related occupations 
soc6= clerical and secretarial occupations 
soc7= associate professional and technical occupations 
soc8= professional occupations 
soc9= managers and administrators 
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Figure 2. Recruitment channel valuation by job qualifications: speed index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Computation based on ERP, Employers’ Recruitment Practices Survey, 1992.  
Higher values of the speed index are associated to higher speed of the channel. 
soc1= routine unskilled occupation 
soc2= operatives and assembly 
soc3= sales occupation 
soc4= personal and protective service occupations 
soc5= craft and related occupations 
soc6= clerical and secretarial occupations 
soc7= associate professional and technical occupations 
soc8= professional occupations 
soc9= managers and administrators 
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Table 1. Composition of the ERP dataset, percentage. 
 
Contract type: Full dataset Sample 
Temporary 13.78 14.49 
Casual 0.85 0.87 
Fixed-term 5.49 5.61 
Permanent 77.05 79.92 
Provisional 2.47 2.10 
Self-employed          0.15 - 
Don't know/Not answered 0.21 - 
Sample size (engagements) 20,054 12,805 
Establishments' characteristics:   
SIC:   
1. Energy and water supply 1.25 1.40 
2. Metals, minerals, etc. 4.44 4.25 
3. Metal goods, engineering, etc. 11.24 11.06 
4. Other manufacturing 12.94 13.00 
5. Construction 3.19 2.68 
6. Distribution, catering, etc. 22.17 19.91 
7. Transport and communication 3.98 3.88 
8. Banking, insurance, etc. 14.58 14.50 
9. Other services 26.21 29.32 
Sample size (establishment) 5,295 4,069 
Size:   
3 - 10 10.75 7.90 
11 - 24 14.18 12.00 
25 - 49 14.39 12.76 
50 - 99 13.94 13.87 
100 - 199 13.66 14.19 
200 - 499 15.47 18.14 
500 - 999 9.07 10.78 
1000 - 1999 5.51 6.68 
2000 or more 3.04 3.68 
Sample size (establishment) 5,302 4,074 
Region:   
London/SE 17.43 17.23 
South West 10.13 10.14 
West Mids 10.56 10.41 
E Mids/East 11.47 11.68 
York/Humber 9.90 10.16 
North West 11.03 10.70 
North 9.68 9.50 
Wales 9.51 9.60 
Scotland 10.30 10.58 
Sample size (establishment) 5,302 4,074 
Job's characteristics:   
SOC:   
Routine, unskilled 15.31 10.52 
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Operatives & assembly 14.39 28.62 
Sales 11.15 12,45 
Protective and Personal service 7.51 6.07 
Craft & Skilled Service 9.23 6.39 
Clerical & Secretarial 18.47 16.98 
Professional assoc & technical 8.60 6.35 
Professional 8.04 9.07 
Management & administration 7.31 3.54 
Sample size 20,054 12,805 
Workers' characteristics:   
Gender:   
Male 48.96 51.03 
Female 51.04 48.97 
Sample size 20,013 12,805 
Age:   
16-18 8.33 7.56 
19-24 25.63 24.41 
25-34 33.41 34.70 
35-44 20.26 21.02 
45-54 9.80 9.79 
55 or over 2.57 2.51 
Sample size 19,807 12,805 
Employment status:   
Sub-contract/agency employee working at this establish. 3.18 3.69 
Employee at a different establishment of this organization 4.83 5.38 
Working for another employer 36.14 38.86 
Unemployed 34.69 35.29 
In full time education 9.66 8.68 
Not in the labour market 4.73 4.82 
Other 3.21 3.28 
Don't know / Not stated 3.55 - 
Sample size 20,054 12,805 
Screening effort: Permanent Temporary 
Cost index: mean 
(standard deviation) 
-4.50 
(0.51) 
-4.73 
(0.50) 
Speed index: mean 
(standard deviation) 
5.46 
(0.29) 
5.58 
(0.30) 
Sample size 12890 3190 
 
Source: Computation based on Hales, J., Employers’ Recruitment Practices: The 1992 Survey. 
Values are computed as percentages over the number of answers. 
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Table 2. Composition of the SS dataset, percentage. 
 
Contract type: Full sample Short tenure 
Temporary 7.38 11.00 
Permanent 92.62 89.00 
Sample size  2,195 1,100 
Establishments' characteristics:   
SIC:   
1. Primary sector 1.32 0.82 
2. Manufacturing 21.37 21.82 
3. Energy and water supply 0.77 0.82 
4. Construction 4.24 3.55 
5. Distribution, catering, etc. 17.77 20.09 
6. Transport and communication 7.52 7.18 
7. Banking, insurance, etc. 4.56 4.27 
8. Other services 42.46 41.45 
Sample size 2,195 1,100 
Size:   
1 - 10 17.18 19.00 
11 - 24 14.44 16.45 
25 - 49 13.71 15.00 
50 - 99 13.21 13.18 
100 - 199 8.84 7.64 
200 - 499 15.49 13.82 
500 - 999 6.83 6.09 
1000 - 1999 4.42 3.64 
2000 or more 5.88 5.18 
Sample size 2,195 1,100 
Job's characteristics:   
SOC:   
Routine, unskilled 7.65 8.73 
Operatives & assembly 11.07 10.82 
Sales 7.43 8.73 
Protective and Personal service 10.62 12.55 
Craft & Skilled Service 10.48 8.18 
Clerical & Secretarial 18.22 18.45 
Professional assoc & technical 10.07 9.36 
Professional 10.93 9.27 
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Management & administration 13.53 13.91 
Sample size 2,195 1,100 
Workers' characteristics:   
Gender:   
Female 49.43 52.64 
Male 50,57 47.36 
Sample size 2,195  
Age:   
20-24 8.56 14.36 
25-34 30.98 37.18 
35-44 29.16 26.18 
45-54 23.74 17.45 
55 60 7.56 4.82 
Sample size 2,195 1,100 
Monitoring perception: permanent temporary permanent temporary 
not at all closely supervised 23.66 26.54 22.27 23.97 
not very closely supervised 43.53 39.51 42.70 38.84 
quite closely supervised 26.27 26.54 27.27 28.93 
very closely supervised 6.30 7.41 7.35 8.26 
don’t know 0.25 0.00 0.41 0.00 
Sample size 2,033 162 979 121 
 
Source: Computation based on Ashton, D., Felstead, A. and Green, F., Skills Survey, 1997. 
Values are computed as percentages over the number of answers. 
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Table 3. Recruitment cost (method B), FE estimates. 
 
 Full sample New hires3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
temporary contract -0.089   -0.110   
 (0.013)***   (0.015)***   
temporaryxsoc11  -0.082   -0.082  
  (0.027)***   (0.030)***  
temporaryxsoc21  -0.159   -0.159  
  (0.029)***   (0.032)***  
temporaryxsoc31  -0.115   -0.108  
  (0.043)***   (0.047)**  
temporaryxsoc41  -0.032   -0.079  
  (0.037)   (0.042)*  
temporaryxsoc51  -0.058   -0.092  
  (0.041)   (0.044)**  
temporaryxsoc61  -0.115   -0.150  
  (0.024)***   (0.028)***  
temporaryxsoc71  -0.081   -0.144  
  (0.039)**   (0.044)***  
temporaryxsoc81  -0.003   -0.007  
  (0.037)   (0.043)  
temporaryxsoc91  -0.068   -0.087  
  (0.058)   (0.068)  
temporaryxSOC1xSIC12   -0.175   -0.260 
   (0.102)*   (0.125)** 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC22   -0.154   -0.190 
   (0.025)***   (0.028)***
temporaryxSOC1xSIC32   -0.247   -0.284 
   (0.107)**   (0.119)** 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC42   -0.068   -0.072 
   (0.018)***   (0.020)***
temporaryxSOC2xSIC12   -0.231   -0.212 
   (0.210)   (0.265) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC22   -0.027   -0.086 
   (0.073)   (0.082) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC32   -0.339   -0.438 
   (0.173)*   (0.189)** 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC42   -0.036   -0.058 
   (0.027)   (0.032)* 
Controls:       
Workers’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jobs’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 12805 12805 12805 11441 11441 11441 
Num. groups 4074 4074 4074 3926 3926 3926 
R-squared (within) 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the cost of recruitment computed according to method B (see Section 3).  
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Reading: 
Fixed effects estimates over establishments. All models control for workers’ characteristics: gender, age group 
(6 dummies), ethnic group (dummy equal to 1 if white), disability, previous employment status (dummy equal 
to 1 if employed), whether the individual was previously employed in the same firm; and jobs’ characteristics: 
occupation (9 dummies), initial pay, supervision task, whether the engagement involved only the firm’s 
standard recruitment procedure. 
 
1 interaction among temporary and a dummy equal to 1 when the new engagement is in occupation soc1-9 
2 interaction among temporary, a dummy equal to 1 when the new engagement is in occupation SOC1-2, and a 
dummy equal to 1 when the firm belongs to industry SIC1-4  
3 subsample composed by engagements for which it was not hired a former employee and whose recruitment 
didn’t involved the use of waiting lists. 
 
soc1-9: standard occupation classification (UK, 1990) 
soc1= routine unskilled occupation 
soc2= operatives and assembly workers 
soc3= sales occupation 
soc4= personal and protective service occupations 
soc5= craft and related occupations 
soc6= clerical and secretarial occupations 
soc7= associate professional and technical occupations 
soc8= professional occupations 
soc9= managers and administrators 
SOC1-2: groups of soc 
SOC1= unskilled workers, i.e. soc1-6 
SOC2= skilled workers, i.e. soc7-9 
SIC1-4: industry 
SIC1= energy and water supply 
SIC2= manufacturing 
SIC3= construction 
SIC4= services 
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Table 4. Recruitment speed (method B), FE estimates. 
 
 Full sample New hires3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
temporary contract 0.086   0.090   
 (0.008)***   (0.009)***   
temporaryxsoc11  0.099   0.093  
  (0.017)***   (0.019)***  
temporaryxsoc21  0.127   0.128  
  (0.018)***   (0.020)***  
temporaryxsoc31  0.111   0.083  
  (0.027)***   (0.029)***  
temporaryxsoc41  0.009   0.031  
  (0.023)   (0.026)  
temporaryxsoc51  0.085   0.091  
  (0.025)***   (0.027)***  
temporaryxsoc61  0.105   0.110  
  (0.015)***   (0.017)***  
temporaryxsoc71  0.041   0.036  
  (0.024)*   (0.027)  
temporaryxsoc81  0.058   0.086  
  (0.023)**   (0.027)***  
temporaryxsoc91  0.057   0.054  
  (0.035)   (0.042)  
temporaryxSOC1xSIC12   0.232   0.285 
   (0.062)***   (0.077)***
temporaryxSOC1xSIC22   0.129   0.135 
   (0.015)***   (0.017)***
temporaryxSOC1xSIC32   0.158   0.215 
   (0.066)**   (0.074)***
temporaryxSOC1xSIC42   0.071   0.068 
   (0.011)***   (0.013)***
temporaryxSOC2xSIC12   0.230   0.201 
   (0.129)*   (0.164) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC22   -0.075   -0.059 
   (0.045)*   (0.051) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC32   0.239   0.274 
   (0.106)**   (0.117)** 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC42   0.059   0.066 
   (0.017)***   (0.020)***
Controls:       
Workers’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jobs’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 12805 12805 12805 11441 11441 11441 
Num. groups 4074 4074 4074 3926 3926 3926 
R-squared (within) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the speed of recruitment computed according to method B, order 1 (see Section 3).  
Reading: see Table 4. 
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Table 5. Recruitment cost, Robustness analysis, OLS estimates. 
 
 Non urgent engagements 4 Engagement E5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
temporary contract -0.142   -0.359   
 (0.042)***   (0.148)**   
temporaryxsoc11  -0.252   0.180  
  (0.109)**   (0.314)  
temporaryxsoc21  -0.128   -0.532  
  (0.109)   (0.392)  
temporaryxsoc31  -0.093   -0.830  
  (0.130)   (0.412)**  
temporaryxsoc41  -0.180   1.115  
  (0.173)   (0.720)  
temporaryxsoc51  0.024   -0.574  
  (0.135)   (0.543)  
temporaryxsoc61  -0.260   -0.630  
  (0.083)***   (0.275)**  
temporaryxsoc71  -0.023   -0.458  
  (0.125)   (0.494)  
temporaryxsoc81  -0.024   0.179  
  (0.149)   (1.024)  
temporaryxsoc91  -0.018   -0.514  
  (0.251)   (1.161)  
temporaryxSOC1xSIC12   -0.005   0.164 
   (0.258)   (0.921) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC22   -0.295   -0.422 
   (0.075)***   (0.239)*
temporaryxSOC1xSIC32   0.863   -1.167 
   (0.431)**   (0.908) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC42   -0.124   -0.294 
   (0.060)**   (0.210) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC12   -0.266   0.000 
   (0.431)   (0.000) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC22   0.071   -0.258 
   (0.252)   (0.703) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC32   0.057   -1.724 
   (0.433)   (2.039) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC42   -0.030   -0.319 
   (0.101)   (0.516) 
Controls:       
Workers’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jobs’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firms’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1489 1489 1489 1453 1453 1453 
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the cost of recruitment.  
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4 subsample composed by engagement for which the responder answered “No” to the question: “Suppose that for 
some reason he/she could not have started work till a month later. Would this delay have mattered to you or 
not?”. The cost index is computed according to method B (see Section 3). 
5 subsample composed by the second most recent engagement of each firm. The cost index is the firm-specific 
valuation of the recruitment method, according to the answer to question “How important a factor in your use of 
the recruitment method(s) was keeping down the cost of announcing/advertising the vacancy on this occasion?”  
 
Reading:  
OLS estimates. All models control for workers’ characteristics: gender, age group (6 dummies), ethnic group 
(dummy equal to 1 if white), disability, previous employment status (dummy equal to 1 if employed), whether 
the individual was previously employed in the same firm; jobs’ characteristics: occupation (9 dummies), initial 
pay, supervision task, whether the engagement involved only the firm’s standard recruitment procedure; and 
firms’ characteristics: industry (9 dummies), region (9 dummies), labor force, level of activity, trend of activity, 
quality of the workforce. 
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Table 6. Recruitment speed, Robustness analysis, OLS estimates. 
 
 Non urgent engagements 4 Engagement E5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
temporary contract 0.108   0.392   
 (0.028)***   (0.114)***   
temporaryxsoc11  0.119   0.166  
  (0.072)*   (0.242)  
temporaryxsoc21  0.126   0.339  
  (0.072)*   (0.296)  
temporaryxsoc31  0.251   0.221  
  (0.086)***   (0.323)  
temporaryxsoc41  0.219   1.394  
  (0.114)*   (0.575)**  
temporaryxsoc51  0.265   0.338  
  (0.089)***   (0.389)  
temporaryxsoc61  0.059   0.587  
  (0.055)   (0.210)***  
temporaryxsoc71  -0.025   0.486  
  (0.082)   (0.383)  
temporaryxsoc81  -0.044   -0.205  
  (0.098)   (0.817)  
temporaryxsoc91  0.047   -0.028  
  (0.166)   (0.807)  
temporaryxSOC1xSIC12   0.050   0.908 
   (0.171)   (0.688) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC22   0.140   0.664 
   (0.050)***   (0.180)***
temporaryxSOC1xSIC32   0.021   -0.004 
   (0.285)   (0.669) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC42   0.151   0.192 
   (0.040)***   (0.162) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC12   0.268   -1.023 
   (0.285)   (1.631) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC22   -0.369   0.117 
   (0.167)**   (0.556) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC32   -0.144   0.171 
   (0.286)   (1.620) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC42   0.020   0.473 
   (0.067)   (0.399) 
Controls:       
Workers’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jobs’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firms’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 1489 1489 1489 1551 1551 1551 
R-squared (within) 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the speed of recruitment.  
Reading: see Table 6. 
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Table 7. Monitoring perception, OLS estimates. 
 
 Full sample Short tenure sample7 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
temporary contract -0.021   0.055   
 (0.075)   (0.087)   
temporaryxsoc11  -0.039   0.384  
  (0.252)   (0.296)  
temporaryxsoc21  0.100   0.226  
  (0.219)   (0.242)  
temporaryxsoc31  -0.360   -0.522  
  (0.349)   (0.387)  
temporaryxsoc41  -0.032   0.263  
  (0.191)   (0.225)  
temporaryxsoc51  -0.288   -0.264  
  (0.272)   (0.357)  
temporaryxsoc61  0.115   0.141  
  (0.178)   (0.204)  
temporaryxsoc71  0.060   0.068  
  (0.233)   (0.261)  
temporaryxsoc81  -0.017   -0.200  
  (0.169)   (0.214)  
temporaryxsoc91  -0.110   -0.049  
  (0.248)   (0.277)  
temporaryxSOC1xSIC06   -1.149   (dropped) 
   (0.613)*    
temporaryxSOC1xSIC12   (dropped)   (dropped) 
       
temporaryxSOC1xSIC22   0.211   0.331 
   (0.202)   (0.227) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC32   0.415   0.616 
   (0.386)   (0.449) 
temporaryxSOC1xSIC42   -0.087   0.033 
   (0.109)   (0.126) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC06   (dropped)   (dropped) 
       
temporaryxSOC2xSIC12   (dropped)   (dropped) 
       
temporaryxSOC2xSIC22   -0.030   -0.044 
   (0.347)   (0.353) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC32   -0.337   -0.423 
   (0.600)   (0.617) 
temporaryxSOC2xSIC42   -0.002   -0.064 
   (0.130)   (0.158) 
Controls:       
Workers’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jobs’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firms’ characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 2020 2020 2020 1002 1002 1002 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the subjective perception of being monitored on the job. 
 
Reading: 
OLS estimates. All models control for workers’ characteristics: gender, age, ethnic group (dummy equal to 1 
if white), disability; jobs’ characteristics: occupation (9 dummies), supervision task, working day, whether the 
individual is involved in training, tenure (dummy equal to 1 if tenure shorter than 5 year); firms’ 
characteristics: size, industry (8 dummies), whether the firm belongs to the public sector, and whether it is 
committed to or recognized as an Investor in People (i.e. government scheme to promote learning in 
organizations). 
 
1 interaction among temporary and a dummy equal to 1 when the new engagement is in occupation soc1-9 
2 interaction among temporary, a dummy equal to 1 when the new engagement is in occupation SOC1-2, and a 
dummy equal to 1 when the firm belongs to industry SIC0-4. 
6 SIC0= primary sector 
7 subsample composed by worker with tenure lower than 5 year, in the same job with the same employer. 
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Table 8. Monitoring perception, OLS estimates. 
 
 Full sample 
 (1) (2) 
short tenure -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
temporary contract -0.204  
 (0.148)  
temporaryxsoc11  -0.518 
  (0.299)* 
temporaryxsoc21  -0.462 
  (0.288) 
temporaryxsoc31  -0.892 
  (0.392)** 
temporaryxsoc41  -0.508 
  (0.248)** 
temporaryxsoc51  -0.676 
  (0.300)** 
temporaryxsoc61  -0.390 
  (0.245) 
temporaryxsoc71  0.439 
  (0.328) 
temporaryxsoc81  0.287 
  (0.252) 
temporaryxsoc91  0.257 
  (0.334) 
temporaryxshort8 0.243  
 (0.170)  
temporaryxSOC1xshort9  0.646 
  (0.217)*** 
temporaryxSOC2xshort9  -0.437 
  (0.272) 
Controls:   
Workers’ characteristics   
Jobs’ characteristics   
Firms’ characteristics   
   
Observations 2020 2020 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.06 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are for the subjective perception of being monitored on the job. 
 
8 interaction among temporary and a dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s tenure is lower than 5 years. 
9 interaction among temporary, a dummy equal to 1 when the new engagement is in occupation SOC1-2, and a 
dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s tenure is lower than 5 years. 
 
Reading: see Table 8. 
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